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Summary 
This paper focuses on the broad package of modern management tools that are used by 
Norwegian state organizations. These tools are regarded as forms of regulation inside 
government as well as a shopping basket. We describe the range of different tools and 
look at how intensively they are used and how they are interrelated. We also examine 
variations in use of these tools by different state organizations. The database is a survey 
addressed to all organizations in the Norwegian civil service, apart from the ministries, 
in 2004. Our theoretical approach is primarily based on neo-institutional theory. Our 
main empirical findings are that the use of modern management tools is widespread; 
that some are very common while others are more marginal; that there are different 
families of tools that supplement each other; that there is significant variation in the use 
of different tools; and that agency size is the most important factor in explaining the use 
of different tools. 
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Sammendrag 
Dette notatet fokuserer på den store pakken av styringsverktøy som blir brukt i norske 
sentrale forvaltningsorgan. Disse virkemidlene kan oppfattes som ulike interne 
reguleringsformer eller som en handlekorg av populære standarder for moderne 
organisasjoner. Vi beskriver variasjonsbredden og omfanget av ulike virkemidler og i 
hvilken grad de er supplerende eller alternative metoder. Vi undersøker også i hvor stor 
grad de benyttes i ulike typer forvaltningsorganer. Det teoretiske utgangspunktet er 
hovedsakelig ny-instutusjonell teori. Det empiriske grunnlaget er en spørreundersøkelse 
til alle sentrale forvaltningsorganer utenom departementene som ble gjennomført i 
2004. Vi viser at det er stor bruk av slike moderne styringsverktøy i norsk 
sentraladministrasjon. Noen er svært vanlige mens andre er mer sjeldne. Det er ulike 
familier av virkemidler som supplerer hverandre, og det er stor variasjon i bruk av ulike 
virkemidler mellom ulike organisasjoner i sentraladministrasjonen. Organisasjonenes 
størrelse er den faktoren som forklarer mest av variasjonen i bruk av ulike virkemidler. 
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Introduction 
In this paper we will focus on the broad package of modern management tools or 
techniques that may be used by Norwegian state organizations. Three types of questions 
will be discussed. The first relates to the range of tools and how widely they are being 
put to use. What is the content of the techniques? Which are the most popular 
techniques, and which techniques are more marginal?  
The second type of question concerns the relationship between the tools. Are certain 
techniques connected to others? Which techniques might be described as a family, to 
what degree do they represent competing alternatives, and to what extent do they 
overlap and supplement one another? The final type of question addresses variations in 
the use of management tools by Norwegian state organizations. How can we explain 
variations in the number of techniques used and in which ones are chosen? 
In some instances, certain types of management tools can be initiated by actors 
outside the organization, and can be seen as a way to carry out central regulation, 
control or steering of activities within government organizations towards a desirable 
standard, procedure, result or goal. Using different types of internal management tools 
is an indirect form of regulation inside government. Regulation is normally considered 
to be regulation by the state, but there is also a growing focus on regulation inside 
government carried out by a variety of public agencies that set standards and use 
different forms of performance management and compliance measures to audit 
government organizations’ work (Hood et al. 1999, James 2000, Power 1997). 
In other instances, the management tools can be initiated by the organization itself – 
owing to a wish to emulate organizational trends observed among similar actors or 
organizations in the environment, or for increasing local efficiency. Thus, state 
organizations may pick and choose for their shopping basket among available tools on 
the shelves, based on considerations on enhancing the legitimacy in their environment, 
or on instrumental goal attainment. Some of the tools may also imply regulation of 
activities within the organizations, introduced by actors outside the organization or as a 
form of self-regulation in the organization. Thus, regarding management tools as 
regulation inside government or as choices for a shopping basket may to some extent 
overlap.  
We start by giving a brief outline of the Norwegian context and the database. The 
database used is a survey addressed to organizations in the Norwegian civil service in 
2004 – i.e. organizations that are part of the state as a legal entity and report to one or 
more ministries. It excludes ministries, local government, state-owned companies and 
governmental foundations. We then go on to present some theoretical ideas, mainly 
based on neo-institutional theory, on the use of management tools as regulation inside 
government and as a shopping basket, and derive different hypotheses on the extent 
and variation of the adoption of tools among state organizations. The empirical part of 
the paper starts by presenting the full range of modern management tools and 
examining the connections between them. We then examine the variations in use of the 
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tools by agencies by using bivariate and multivariate analyses. In conclusion we outline 
our main empirical findings and discuss some implications. 
The context 
Norway is a small, unitary, parliamentary, and multi-party state. Since the early 1970s, it 
has mainly been ruled by minority governments, and since 1994 it has been connected 
to the EU through the Economic Area Agreement. In a comparative perspective, it has 
a strong democratic tradition, scores high on per capita income and abundance of 
natural resources, has relatively strong collectivistic and egalitarian values, is consensus-
oriented and has well-developed corporatist arrangements. It also has one of the most 
comprehensive and universal welfare states in the world, with a large public sector. The 
relationships between parliament, ministers, and agencies are based on the principle of 
ministerial responsibility, meaning that the minister is responsible to the parliament for 
all activities in the ministry as well as in subordinate bodies within his or her policy area. 
Political control over the civil service has, however, been general and passive, allowing 
the executive a lot of leeway. This seems to reflect some major features of the political-
administrative system: high levels of mutual trust and shared attitudes and norms among 
political and administrative leaders and within the public sector (Christensen and 
Lægreid 2005). There is also a high degree of transparency and an open attitude to 
critical scrutiny by the media. 
Agencies have been a major organizational form in the Norwegian central 
government for a long time. A main organizational principle is that technical issues and 
routine tasks should be handled by agencies, while policy and planning tasks should stay 
within the ministries. The dominant agency model in Norway has historically been 
rather unified, with little horizontal specialization (Christensen and Lægreid 2004a). In 
most agencies administrative tasks, regulatory and control tasks, and service provision 
and production tasks have been combined and integrated. Traditionally, Norway has not 
had any type of administrative court. Appeals are directed to the parent ministry, which 
can also instruct the agencies. The idea that there ought to be separate agencies for 
different types of tasks is rather new, although some of the agencies have enjoyed 
enhanced authority for some time, mainly in financial and personnel matters, but also in 
some substantive areas (Lægreid et al. 2003). 
Over the past 15 years, a process of structural devolution has been going on in 
Norwegian central government, and the independent agency model has become more 
differentiated (Christensen and Lægreid 2004a). This development was partly inspired 
by New Public Management ideas and solutions, but was also a part of Norway’s 
adaptation to the EU and the internal market. The model combines vertical inter-
organizational specialization, whereby agencies formally gain more authority, with 
increased horizontal inter-organizational specialization, whereby the distribution of roles 
and tasks among agencies is more differentiated and non-overlapping.  
Another main feature of Norwegian-style NPM has been the pragmatic introduction 
of a formalized performance-assessment regime – labelled «management by objectives 
and results» (MBOR) (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2006a). A main tool for 
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regulating relations between ministries and agencies is the performance-management 
system. One part of this system is the establishment of a quasi-contractual steering 
model, whereby the parent ministry allocates resources and specifies targets and goals 
for the various agencies by means of an annual steering document. The agencies, in 
turn, are expected to report on performance through formal reports and a formalised 
steering dialogue. The idea is to make the managers manage by the use of steering and 
reporting documents, formal steering procedures and dialogues, performance-
management techniques and agency steering meetings. The MBOR concept was put 
into practice through three reform measures from 1990 onwards: activity planning, 
budget reforms, and pay reforms, all of which are now integrated parts of the 
governmental financial regulatory system. 
Summing up, recent Norwegian administrative reform is characterized by a reluctant 
approach to NPM that has focused more on the managerial component of NPM than 
on the marketization component. The reform movement has, however, gathered pace 
over the last decade (Christensen and Lægreid 2004b). 
Database and methodology 
In the formal structural arrangements of the Norwegian state apparatus the form of 
affiliation is a crucial feature for determining whether an organization is part of the civil 
service or not. At the national level the civil service is divided into quite small ministries 
with directorates/central agencies, other ordinary public administration bodies, agencies 
with extended authority and government administrative enterprises, all outside the 
ministries but reporting to a ministry. Civil service organizations at the regional or local 
level may report either directly to a ministry or through an organization at the national 
level. All civil service organizations are, legally speaking, government entities subject to 
ministerial directions and subordinated to ministerial control. In contrast to state-owned 
companies, civil service organizations are regulated through the state budget, the state 
collective wage agreement, the state pension scheme, the Freedom of Information Act 
and thePublic administration Law. Some agencies and all government administrative 
enterprises are given enhanced budgetary leeway (Lægreid et al. 2003). In short, the 
form of affiliation grants different sets of formal constraints or freedom of action within 
a more general regulative framework. 
In Norway, agencies outside the ministries represent the largest share of the civil 
service. In 2003, only a small number of civil servants were employed by ministries 
(about 3,900). In comparison, about 120,000 civil servants (including those at the 
regional and local levels) were employed by directorates/central agencies, other ordinary 
public administration bodies, agencies with extended authority, and government 
administrative enterprises. This number decreased from 185,000 in 1990, mainly due to 
the transformation of some large agencies and administrative enterprises into state-
owned companies outside the civil service (e.g. Norwegian State Railways, the 
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Norwegian Power Company, Telenor, the Norwegian Post and the airport 
administration). 
The civil service organizations are divided into sub-forms of affiliation. As of 2004 there 
were 57 directorates/central agencies, 125 other public administration bodies, 28 
agencies with extended authority, and 5 government administrative enterprises. All in all, 
the population adds up to 215 civil service organizations. One questionnaire was sent to 
each agency, and a central manager was asked to answer on behalf of the whole 
organization. The questionnaire was an adaptation of a similar survey carried out in 
Belgium (Flanders) in 2002–2003 (Verhoest, Verschuere and Bouckaert 2003).1 It was 
rather comprehensive, covering organizational characteristics, autonomy dimensions, 
regulation and control relationships and organizational culture (Lægreid et al. 2004). A 
total of 150 organizations answered the survey, which constitutes a response rate of 
70%. There are only small variations in the response rate according to sub-form of 
affiliation and between different ministerial areas. For half of the ministerial areas the 
response rate was over 80 % and none was below 50 %. Thus, our conclusion is that the 
respondents are quite representative for the population of Norwegian state agencies. 
The dependent variables we will examine in this paper are the use of different 
management techniques, as perceived by the civil service organizations. The 
respondents were questioned about 18 different tools. The question we asked was: «Are 
the following techniques or instruments used in the organization?» The organizations 
could reply «yes» or «no» for each of the tools.2  
To describe the scope, intensity and interconnection between different dependent 
variables we will primarily use univariate frequencies and factor analysis. To explain the 
variation in reported tools we will use bivariate correlations (summed up by measures 
like Pearson’s r) and multivariate analyses, including independent variables having 
significant bivariate correlations. 
Theoretical approaches 
There is no generally accepted framework for characterizing the tools or instruments of 
internal regulation (Hood et al. 1999). Tools for regulation inside government vary 
widely in their explicitness – i.e., how precise or ambiguous they are; in their reflexivity – 
to what extent they are imposed from the top or are voluntary self-regulating 
mechanisms; and in their stability. By reflexivity we mean oversight practice, which 
builds on organizational self-regulation.  
One issue for discussion has been whether New Public Management reforms have 
enhanced a more rule-based, process-driven style of executive government or whether, 
on the contrary, they represent a move away from such an approach to public 
administration (Hood et al. 1999, 2004). The repertoire of techniques is continually 
                                                 
1 The questionnaire is part of the «Comparative Public Organization Data Base for Research and Analysis – Network» 
(COBRA). More information on the COBRA network is available on the Internet: 
http://www.publicmanagement-cobra.org/ 
2 13 organizations did not respond on any of the 18 tools and were excluded from the analysis. Some of the others 
did not respond with regard to specific tools. In these instances, we have included the missing data in the category 
«no».  
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expanding, both internally within each public sector organization and among external 
regulatory bodies. New process rules seem to be added without any substantial 
reduction in the old ones. In spite of all the talk of deregulation there is still a lot of 
oversight going on (Hood et al. 2004). New hybrid forms and mechanisms seem to have 
developed, and there is substantial variety in control over government. The application 
of organizational standards has increased significantly over the past 25 years and 
executives have many different tools to choose from (Christensen et al. 2004). Different 
waves or tides of reform have also highlighted different aspects or tools at different 
times (Light 1997, Talbot 2005). Reform tools tend to follow a cyclical pattern, coming 
into and going out of fashion (Røvik 1996).  
The emergence of new techniques and the intensity of their application are driven by 
both demand and supply (Power 2005). The increase in the range of management tools, 
such as performance management, auditing and quality-measuring instruments, might be 
seen as a response to political demands for greater accountability of public service 
providers, as a product of increased concern with the efficiency and quality of public-
sector services, and as a sign of political determination to meet fiscal constraints.  
The increased use of management tools may also be triggered by supply side factors. 
Public and private professionals, groups of experts and international organizations and 
consultants have all been promoters and carriers of best management practices (Saint-
Martin 2000, Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002). Management consulting firms have 
been labelled as «fashion-setting organizations» whose mission is to create and 
disseminate new management ideas and models (Abrahamson 1996, Saint Martin 2005), 
while international organizations, such as the OECD, have been main carriers and 
promoters of different management tools (Sahlin-Andersson 2001, Marcussen 2004). 
One variety of neo-institutional theory emphasizes that organizations exist in 
institutional environments and prescribes socially defined norms for their structural and 
procedural arrangements (Meyer and Rowan 1977, DiMaggio and Powell 1983). 
Organizations are exposed to and constrained by institutionalized standards that are 
widely accepted prescriptions for how parts of an organization should be organized 
(Røvik 1996). Some authors have referred to this as the «audit explosion» (Power 1997), 
but the scope of management tools is actually much broader, amounting to a 
«performance indicator industry», a «quality industry» and a general «management tool 
industry». Some of these standards are specific techniques, such as Management by 
Objectives, Total Quality Management, Balanced Scorecard, Business Process 
Reengineering and Development Dialogue. Others are general sets of doctrines such as 
New Public Management.  
Techniques are frequently introduced and spread across organizations, policy areas 
and countries (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002). They are no longer confined to 
private firms but have moved into public-sector organizations, which since the mid-
1980s have been considerably more exposed to private-sector management tools. In 
fact, some of these ideas have become so popular that they can be found nearly 
everywhere and in all kinds of organizations. Røvik (2002) labels such ideas 
organizational super-standards, of which Management by Objectives and Total Quality 
Management are two of the most popular in our time. Quality management reforms 
involve a shift in focus away from procedures and input and towards products, 
WORKING PAPER  13  –  2006 MODERN MANAGEMENT  TOOLS  IN  NORWEGIAN  STATE  AGENCIES 
12 
performance, quality of output, customer satisfaction and empowerment of employees 
(Ingraham 1995, Peters and Pierre 2001). This neo-institutional approach argues that the 
main reason for the popularity of such tools is persuasive rhetoric and «taken-for-
grantedness» (Nørreklit 2003), rather than a convincing theoretical foundation or 
documented success.  
Thus there exists a series of organizational improvement initiatives representing 
different frameworks for performance. Some of them are rather holistic or generic, such 
as the benchmarking movement, the quality movement or the balance scorecard 
movement, while others are more sector- or organization-specific (Talbot 2005). There 
are different, interconnected families of management tools, such as auditing tools, 
accounting tools, and quality-assurance tools (Power 2005). There are management tools, 
such as team-based management, transformative management, service management, 
total quality management, knowledge management and value-based management; tools 
for human resource management, such as development dialogue, career planning, 
empowerment, downsizing and headhunting (Kernaghan 2001); tools on organizational 
culture, such as service culture, customer culture and learning culture; tools on how to 
organize the work process, such as value process management, business process 
reengineering, best practice and benchmarking; and tools on steering and control such as 
management by objectives, balanced scorecard, activity-based costing, activity-based 
management, economic value added and contract steering (Christensen et al. 2004). 
There has been an expansion of tools and standards both in scope and in scale. The 
range of activities has broadened, and so have the intensity of application and the 
resources expended. Organizational size and capacity have become significant factors in 
the success of the new standards and tools (Sahlin-Andersson and Engwall 2002).  
One strong neo-institutional tradition focuses more on the similarities between 
organizations than on the differences. The idea of isomorphism implies that over time 
an organizational field will become formally more homogeneous. DiMaggio and Powell 
(1983) distinguish between three mechanisms of isomorphic institutional change: a) 
coercive isomorphism, meaning that organizations are forced via laws or directives 
issued by higher authorities to apply the same instruments; b) mimetic isomorphism, 
meaning that organizations copy other organizations to reduce uncertainty; and c) 
normative isomorphism, which emerges from pressure to establish common 
professional norms and identities. While coercive isomorphism may be categorized as 
hard regulation, since it is mandatory for public sector organizations, mimetic and 
normative isomorphism fall more under the headings of soft regulation, self-
management and voluntary standards (Ahrne and Brunsson 2004, Möth 2004).  
Soft regulation can exist both outside and inside organizations. In the first instance 
rule setting takes place outside the organization and the rules are often formulated 
formally as voluntary standards. In the second instance, soft regulation is internally 
formulated. It tends to be advisory, abstract and rather vague, allowing rule followers 
some discretion. There might also be a blurring of the boundaries between self-
regulation and enforced regulation, represented by the concept of «enforced self-
regulation», meaning that regulatory and management systems prescribe frameworks for 
internal control and self-management in organizations (Ayres and Braithwaite 1992). 
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We will look at the different tools or instruments, such as balanced scorecard, 
management by objectives and total quality management, as institutionalized standards 
(Røvik 1996). Organizations are typically multi-standard organizations that embrace 
many institutionalized standards, some of which may be enforced from above, and 
others adopted locally to reduce uncertainty or else triggered by professionals.  
Standards may cover what organizations want, what they say and how they act. Many 
of the standards are about «how to act», and focus on how various processes, such as 
planning and control, should be designed, how leadership and management should be 
exercised, and how quality should be achieved (Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000). Our 
focus in this paper is on such standards, and we look at them as part of a wider 
discussion of regulation as well as part of a broader package of modern management 
tools. 
We deal in particular with the followers of standards, represented by state 
organizations. We ask what standards are used and who follows the different standards. 
Standards often reflect ideals or popular ideas and not necessary actual practice 
(Brunsson and Jacobsson 2000). Following a standard might either imply changing the 
practice to fit the standard or changing the presentation of practice to fit the standard, 
but also changing the standard to fit the practice. It is not only a question of how a 
standard affects an organization, but also of how an organization affects the standard. 
The different tools are often semi-manufactured products that have to be refined locally 
(Røvik 1998). 
One precondition for the spreading of organizational standards into public bodies is 
that these bodies have a common identity as formal organizations. Many of the recent 
public-sector reforms represented by the concept of «single-purpose organizations» and 
structural devolution have given public bodies more specific organizational 
characteristics (Brunsson and Sahlin-Andersson 2000). The boundaries of public-sector 
organizations are becoming clearer, they have greater autonomy, and they are becoming 
more similar by adopting the same standards and management tools. They are expected 
to follow centrally defined procedural rules, such as management-by-objective-and-
results, but they also have a hierarchy of their own, enhancing managerial discretion and 
freedom locally. Public-sector organizations are seen as efficient rational systems with 
their own specific objectives, instruments, resources and results. Public-sector 
organizations are changing from being sub-units in the larger system of public 
administration and instruments to be used by higher political-administrative levels in the 
state to becoming more autonomous formal organizations (Christensen and Lægreid 
2006). 
The shift in the status of agencies and other public bodies towards that of regular 
formal organizations makes them more susceptible to influence from organizational 
experts and consultants, to the introduction of management tools formerly used mainly 
in private-sector organizations, and to the widespread application of generic standards in 
formal organizations everywhere. A central common feature of such standards is that 
they follow a model of formal organization designed to enhance distinctiveness, 
boundaries, hierarchy and rationality (Brunsson 2006) 
It is also important to note that such standards need not only be adopted by central 
executives who spread them downwards in the hierarchy, but can also be initiated locally 
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and later imposed from the top. One such example is the Service Charter, which 
became mandatory for Norwegian state organizations from 2001 onwards (Stene 2001). 
Public-sector reforms focusing on structural devolution and single-purpose 
organizations strengthen the identity and autonomy of individual public bodies, 
producing a more fragmented and poly-centric network of separate organizations 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2001, Sahlin-Andersson 2001, Brunsson and Sahlin-
Andersson 2000). 
The individual organizations are, however, not only passive adopters of external 
standards. Their leaders can choose between standards and also transform the 
instruments and reshape them to fit their own organization (Sahlin-Andersson 1996, 
Friedland and Alford 1991). The tools are not merely «technical fixes» or a diffusion of 
standardized solutions – for normally the transfer of such management techniques also 
involves local adaptation, modification and interpretation (Pollitt 2004). Thus we can 
expect a lot of variation in the content of specific management techniques even if 
organizations use the same label for them.  
The  impo r t an ce  o f  o r gan i z a t i ona l  f e a t u r e s  
We will apply three sets of organizational features to analyze the popularity and 
variation of management tools, partly as an expression of regulation inside government 
and partly as choices for a shopping basket. What is needed to understand the variation 
in the adoption of the different tools is not a narrow technical approach, but a broad 
approach allowing for both formal and informal factors and internal and external 
features (cf. Power 2005). Taking a broad neo-institutional perspective as the point of 
departure, we start by discussing the importance of informal external features. At the 
same time, we need to be sensitive to the variety of internal organizational features that 
may influence managerial practice. We therefore also discuss the significance of formal 
structural features as well as informal cultural features. Some features may be 
particularly relevant for analyzing the adoption of management tools as an expression of 
regulation inside government, while others are more relevant when regarding the tools 
as part of a shopping basket. Regarding management tools as external regulation of 
organization, we formulate some general hypotheses about variations in the number of 
tools used by state organizations. Regarding the tools as part of a shopping basket we 
also formulate some general hypotheses about variations in the number of tools, as well 
as specific hypotheses about variations in the types of tools used.  
External features 
A first set of factors describes the autonomy and control of agencies primarily as a 
response to external pressure (cf. Olsen 1992). The importance of the environment for 
the use of management tools may be of two kinds (cf. Christensen and Lægreid 2001). 
In the first instance, tools may be adopted as a response to internationally based norms 
and beliefs about how an agency should be run and steered, simply because these have 
become the prevailing doctrine in the institutional environment. As indicated above, one 
variety of neo-institutional theory regards management tools as symbols and rationalized 
myths producing legitimacy (Meyer and Rowan 1977). The more a tool is informed by 
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highly-valued ideas such as modernization, renewal, efficiency and progress, the better it 
travels and the more popular and widely accepted it will become. 
The legitimacy of New Public Management, with its strong focus on privatization, 
agency autonomy, performance management and customer service, has come to be 
taken for granted and NPM has thus become ideologically dominant. Thus, via a 
process of isomorphism, there will be pressure for all state agencies to adopt similar tools. 
Such isomorphism can be coercive, mimetic or normative. Accordingly, generally we 
will expect for the shopping basket that:  
 
H1: A high number of management tools will be adopted and there will be low 
variation between state agencies.  
 
What will be reported, however, is not necessarily practice, but interpretations of 
practice (Sahlin-Andersson 1996). In addition, the more an organization is exposed to 
external criticism, the more it will need to choose modern management tools from the 
shopping basket to reduce this criticism and enhance its legitimacy. Thus, in general we 
will expect:  
 
H2: Agencies exposed to external criticism will adopt management tools to a larger 
extent  than agencies not exposed to this kind of criticism.  
 
In the second instance, tools may be chosen for the shopping basket to solve 
widespread problems created by the technical environment, such as performance and 
economic competition and market pressure in a global economy. Thus, some tools might 
strengthen their ability to handle the technical environment, and will therefore be 
included in their shopping basket:  
 
H3:  Agencies working in a market or quasi-market situation will adopt management 
tools like customer surveys to a larger extent than agencies that have no 
competitors.  
 
In order to enhance free, fair, and equal competition in the market and thus promote 
economy and efficiency it is especially important for agencies operating in the market to 
prevent political executives interfering in their daily business. Pollitt et al. (2004) have 
revealed that the way agencies are steered depends on whether they are embedded in a 
market or not. Agencies operating in a market need commercial independence and 
discretion in order to match their competitors, while steering and interference by parent 
ministries in their daily business tend to undermine their position vis-à-vis other market 
actors. Thus, regarding management tools as external regulation of organizations our 
general hypothesis will be:  
 
H4: Agencies working in a market or a quasi-market situation will adopt management 
tools to a lesser extent than agencies that have no competitors.  
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Structural features 
The second set involves variables formal structural features that may be designed or 
exploited by the executives to make their organizations more efficient. As indicated by 
the concept of bounded rationality (March and Simon 1958), decision-makers face 
problems of capacity and understanding and have to make some selections. The formal 
organizational structure represents one important selection mechanism. Formal 
structure and procedures organize some actors, cleavages, problems, and solutions into 
decision-making processes in the public sector, while others are excluded. 
Gulick (1937) argues that there is a rather close connection between the formal 
structure chosen and practice within and between organizations, underlining that the 
way formal authority is distributed among hierarchical levels is important for autonomy 
and control in practice. In a system characterized by independent agencies this 
distribution is biased against the political executive. The formal instruments of steering 
become diluted as the distance between administrative levels increases, and political 
signals are generally weaker in subordinate bodies than in ministries (Egeberg 2003). It 
makes a difference whether central government is an integrated system under ministerial 
responsibility or a disintegrated system of autonomous or semi-autonomous 
organizations (Christensen and Lægreid 2006). Thus, regarding management tools as 
external regulation of organizations our general hypothesis on the importance of form of 
affiliation will be: 
 
H5a: The structurally devolved organizations will adopt management tools to a lesser 
extent  than ordinary civil service organizations. 
 
On the other hand, however, structurally devolved organizations have fewer restrictions 
on the choice of management tools to make them more efficient. Thus, as indicated in 
the alternative general hypothesis, we will expect their shopping basket to be larger: 
 
H5b: The structurally devolved organizations will adopt management tools to a greater 
 extent than ordinary civil service organizations. 
 
Another structural variable is the character of primary tasks. Studies of state agencies 
reveal that there are significant variations in their behaviour according to what their 
primary tasks are (Pollitt et al. 2004). The task structure is also relevant with regard to 
how autonomy is exercised in practice. Here, the basis for categorizing types of primary 
tasks is the organizations’ own perception of what kind of tasks they have. We will 
distinguish between service-providing or producing tasks on the one hand, and 
regulatory tasks, policy-formulation or other ways of exercising public authority on the 
other. According to the administrative policy doctrines of today, political executives 
should not interfere in the activities of service-providing and producing agencies, 
because this could disturb free and fair market competition and the ability of the 
agencies to be responsive to the demands of customers and service quality. Thus, 
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regarding management tools as external regulation of organizations, our general 
hypothesis on the importance of primary tasks will be:  
 
H6:  Agencies with service-providing or producing tasks will adopt management 
tools to a lesser extent than other agencies.  
 
However, some tools might strengthen their ability to handle the technical environment, 
and will therefore be included in their shopping basket: 
 
H7: Agencies with service-providing or producing tasks will adopt more quality tools 
and customer surveys than other agencies. 
Cultural features 
A third set of factors concerns the historical and cultural traditions of political-
administrative systems (Selznick 1957). The importance of the cultural environment and 
especially the organizational culture are emphasized by several scholars (e.g. Lynn et al. 
2001, Fukuyama 2004, Pollitt et al. 2004). In institutional approaches informal norms, 
identities, and the logic of appropriateness are important (March and Olsen 1989). The 
point of departure is that a certain style of managing agencies has developed over time. 
Norms and values within agencies and central government and internal dynamics are 
important. Path dependencies constrain what is regarded as appropriate and possible to 
move to agency status and how the agencies will operate. The reform road taken reflects 
the main features of national institutional processes, where institutional «roots» 
determine the path forward (Krasner 1988). Change is characterized by historical 
inefficiency and incrementalism. What happens in one agency is not a blueprint for 
developments in other agencies. Administrative traditions represent «filters» producing 
different outcomes in different agencies. 
Certain styles of regulating and controlling agencies have evolved over the years, 
whereby agencies are seen as strong and integrated instruments of political development 
serving particular political goals. For a long time this was a dominant feature of the 
Norwegian administrative model (Grønlie 1999). Over the past years, however, this 
model has been challenged, and the culture has changed towards giving agencies more 
leeway and autonomy and allowing for looser coupling to political goals, and it has 
gradually come to be taken for granted that agencies should be at arm’s length from the 
political executive. The extent of this cultural change will probably vary between 
agencies. In some administrative cultures well-established informal contacts and 
networks between ministries and agencies may undermine their autonomy and create 
stronger integration between ministry and agency than expected from the formal model 
(Jacobsson 1984, Pierre 2004). 
We will distinguish between three indicators of administrative culture. First, agency age. 
Normally, the development of a distinct culture and tradition takes some time. Older 
organizations will tend to have developed a stronger identity than younger ones, and the 
potential for socialization of their members into a common culture is higher. Older 
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organizations will therefore be more able to resist pressure from outside actors as well 
as management trends and fashions. Thus, whether regarding management tools as 
external regulation of organizations or as part of the institutional environment, in 
general we will expect: 
 
H8: Old agencies (established before 1990) will adopt modern management tools to 
a lesser extent than young agencies (established 1990 or later).  
 
Second, agency size. Agency size is normally seen as a structural feature, but in this paper 
we will also use it as an indicator of cultural homogeneity. Small agencies may generally 
have a more homogeneous culture and a more distinct identity than large agencies, and 
they are thus more able to modify signals coming from the ministry. At the same time, 
small agencies may have less administrative capability to exploit and utilize the 
possibilities offered by structural devolution and formal authority. Thus, whether size is 
taken as an indicator of culture or structure, and whether management tools are 
regarded as external regulation of organizations or as instruments for handling the 
technical environment, the general hypothesis will be:  
 
H9: Small agencies will adopt modern management tools to a lesser extent than large 
agencies.  
 
Third, we will expect internal agency culture to affect the adoption of modern 
management tools. Here, regarding management tools as external regulation of 
organizations, the general hypothesis will be: 
 
H10: Agencies with a strong quality of service culture will use modern management 
tools to a lesser extent than other agencies.  
 
However, as indicated above, some tools might be more in line with the existing agency 
culture than others, and will therefore be included in their shopping basket:  
 
H11: Agencies with a strong quality of service culture will adopt tools like customer 
surveys to a larger extent than other agencies.  
 
Before we examine whether these hypotheses hold or not we will discuss the two other 
types of questions concerning the range of tools and how they are related to each other. 
The scope of management tools  
Different types of management techniques can be discerned based on subdivisions 
already defined in the literature (e.g. Lawton and Rose 1994, Pollitt 1995, Ingraham et al. 
2003, Flynn 2002), e.g. financial management techniques, performance management 
MODERN MANAGEMENT  TOOLS  IN  NORWEGIAN  STATE  AGENCIES WORKING PAPER  13  -  2006  
 19 
techniques, quality management techniques and human resource management 
techniques. Some techniques represent manageralistic efforts, while others focus more 
on quality management (Ingraham 1995). It is, however, a confusing area to delve into, 
partly because of the different terminology used by different organizational «tribes». The 
concepts are rather ambiguous and complex, and the different movements are engaged 
in a kind of «religious war» (Øvretveit 2005).  
We will thus stick to an empirical categorization of the different tools and use factor 
analysis to classify the set of tools or techniques used in Norwegian state organizations. 
Conceptually, the 18 items include both external and internal techniques.  
There is significant variation in the extent to which the different tools are adopted by 
state organizations (Table 1). Some management techniques are mandatory and 
externally imposed on most state organizations, which might explain the high scores we 
find for performance reporting in annual reports, budget documents, and operational 
and strategic plans, but also for management-by-objectives-and-results, which is rooted 
in the governmental financial regulative framework (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 
2006a). This type of reporting on organizational performance and results is clearly 
linked to conscious and active reform efforts undertaken by central government in 
recent decades, aimed at increasing relevant steering information in central 
governmental regulative systems and related documents, in particular the budget system. 
These tools, which are now found in almost all state organizations, can be labelled 
super-standards. The same can be said about development dialogue (Røvik 2002). All 
agencies in our sample use this management idea. Service charters, which were a main 
modernizing idea in the Bondevik I government (1997–2000), are also a widespread 
tool.3 The government’s goal was that all state agencies should have a service declaration 
by the end of 2000. In 2004, 77% of the agencies in our sample reported that they used 
service declarations to some or a great extent. A common feature of these frequently 
used tools is that they are coercive and made mandatory for all agencies by the 
government. 
In addition, the use of management techniques perhaps more often associated with 
private-sector organizations, such as customer surveys (69%), knowledge-based 
management (57%) and team-based management (53%), have become quite widespread 
among state agencies. These tools are more voluntary. Approximately one third of the 
organizations report that they use management techniques such as balanced scorecard, 
benchmarking,4 service-based management and contract steering.5 These are also 
                                                 
3 Development dialogue and service charters are not included in Table 1 since they were not part of this question 
battery, but were covered in other questions in the survey. 
4 Benchmarking represents a package of various tools for systematic comparison of result achievement and 
production processes. The aim is to evaluate the organizations’ efficiency and productivity by comparing the 
organization with other organizations. Comparison may include international comparisons (other countries) or 
other organizations operating within the same policy field or executing similar tasks, but comparison can also be 
made within the realm of the organization itself – i.e. between different sub-units. It is assumed that benchmarking 
as a technique will uncover best practice within a specific field, which then will represent the desired standard for 
organizations to achieve. 
5 Contractualization is a feature primarily stemming from NPM ideology. In theory such contracts – or, in the case of 
state organizations without a legal identity separate from that of the state «quasi-contracts» – provide for greater 
clarity concerning objectives, performance criteria and available resources (Pollitt 1995). 
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management techniques more often associated with the private sector, but they seem to 
have gained some ground in the public sector.  
Table 1. Management tools, techniques or instruments used in Norwegian state organizations 2004. 
Percentages. (N = 137) 
 Yes No 
Performance reporting (annual reports, budget documents, 
operational plans, strategic plans) 
99 1 
Management-by-objective-and-results (MBOR) 85 15 
Customer surveys 69 31 
Knowledge-based management 57 43 
Team-based management 53 47 
Service-based management 36 64 
Internal quality monitoring units 33 67 
Benchmarking 31 69 
Balanced scorecard 29 71 
Contract steering 27 73 
Quality management systems (ISO etc.) 26 74 
Total quality management 23 77 
Quality standards (CAF etc.) 18 82 
Value-based management 14 86 
Activity-based management (ABM) 3 97 
Activity based costing (ABC) 1 99 
Value process management 1 99 
Economic value added (EVA) 0 100 
 
Having internal quality-monitoring units is also relevant for more than 30% of the 
organizations, while fewer state organizations report using quality standards for 
production and service delivery like CAF6 (18%) or value-based management (14%). 
                                                 
6 Common Assessment Framework (CAF) is a self-evaluation tool for public sector organizations, developed on a 
European basis from 1998 onwards, allowing for the sharing of best practices and benchmarking (Engel 2002, see 
also Thijs and Staes 2006). 
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Still, quality management systems such as ISO7 or total quality management8 are relevant 
for about one quarter of the organizations. On the other hand, almost all of the 
organizations report that management techniques such as value process management, 
activity-based costing, activity-based management and economic value added are not 
relevant at all and not in use in their organization.9 
14 of the 18 listed tools are used by a significant number of the agencies, and 11 of 
them are used by one quarter or more of the agencies. The maximum number of tools 
used in one agency is 14, all agencies use at least one tool, and on average they use 6 of 
the listed tools. With regard to the total number of tools adopted we distinguish between 
low users of three tools or fewer (18%), average users of 4–9 tools (69%) and high users 
of 10 tools or more (13%).  
A factor analysis10 of the 13 tools used by more than 13% of the agencies (but not by 
almost all agencies) reveals that they can be grouped into four clusters or families (Table 
2).  
                                                 
7 ISO, the International Organization for Standards, mainly produces and formulates international standards for trade 
and industry, but in recent years it has also formulated standards relevant for and adopted by many governmental 
organizations in different countries around the world in areas such as quality management (ISO 9000) and 
environmental challenges (ISO 14 000). Today, these standards are among the ISO’s most widely known standards. 
8 Total quality management is a comprehensive strategy of organizational and attitude change enabling staff to learn 
and use quality methods in order to reduce costs and to respond to the requirements of patients and other 
customers (Øvretveit 2005).  
9 The last three management tools are mainly financial performance techniques and involve cost-accounting tools and 
analysis. These techniques, in their original form, emphasize organizational efficiency, productivity and profit. 
Activity-based management (ABM) is closely linked to activity-based costing (ABC) and shared a common focus 
on the organization’s activities. But while ABC is a narrower cost-accounting tool mainly involving productivity 
analysis, ABM also involves an extended focus on steering and strategy and represents a process-steering tool.  
10 In each category we include variables with factor scores ≥.50 in the indexes. 
11 The index is constructed by counting occurrences of agencies reporting that they use the four tools included in 
category 1 in the factor analysis. There are relatively strong significant intercorrelations between the tools in this 
category, ranging from .20 to .60. 
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Table 2. Factor analysis. Different management tools. Rotated Component Matrix(a). (N=137) 
 Component 
 Managerial 
tools 
Quality 
tools 
Performance 
steering 
Balanced 
Scorecard 
Quality standards  
Customers surveys 
Quality management systems 
Internal quality monitoring units 
MBOR 
Balanced Scorecard 
Contract steering 
Benchmarking 
Value-based management 
Total quality management 
Team-based management 
Knowledge based management 
Service-based management 
-.013 
.306 
.019 
-.002 
-.037 
-176 
.182 
.067 
.387 
.584 
.661 
.823 
.752 
.555 
.351 
.657 
.336 
-.077 
.157 
.215 
.777 
.318 
-.098 
.086 
.177 
.131 
 
-.007 
.251 
.249 
.592 
.725 
.097 
.694 
.166 
-.034 
.245 
-.046 
-.100 
.135 
.003 
-.544 
.196 
-.131 
.322 
.786 
-.151 
-.044 
.390 
-.018 
.035 
-.067 
.177 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
a: Rotation converged in 6 iterations. 
The first category consists of knowledge-based management, team-based management, 
service-based management and total quality management. We label this category 
managerial tools. For the rest of the analysis we use an additive index for the use of 
managerial tools, ranging from 0 to 4.11 29 % of the agencies report that they do not use 
any of the four listed tools, 16% say they use one, 23% two, 20% three and 12% use all 
four tools.  
The second category consists of quality management systems, quality standards and 
benchmarking. We label this category quality tools, representing the «quality movement» 
in public administration (Øvretveit 2005). For the rest of the analysis we also use an 
additive index for the use of quality tools, ranging from 0 to 3.12 51% of the agencies 
report that they do not use any of the three listed quality tools, 28% use one, 14% two, 
and 7% use all three tools. Overall, the quality management tools are less widespread 
than the more general management tools included in category 1.  
                                                 
12 The index is constructed by counting occurrences of agencies reporting that they use the three tools included in 
category 2 in the factor analysis. The intercorrelations between these tools range from .15 to .38. 
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The third category consists of internal quality monitoring units, management-by-
objectives-and-results and contract steering. Performance management systems 
specifying targets, performance indicators and performance reporting are central 
components in this family of tools, and we label this category performance steering tools. For 
the rest of this analysis we also use an additive index for these tools, ranging from 0 to 
3.13 13% of the agencies report that they do not use any of the three listed performance 
steering tools, 45% use one, 26% two and 16% use all three tools. It is rather surprising 
that 13% of the agencies do not use any of these tools, since one of them (MBOR) is 
mandatory. 
The fourth category in the factor analysis contains only one variable, balanced scorecard, 
and 29% of the agencies report that they apply this tool. This technique does not fit 
directly either into the quality tools family or into the performance-steering tools family, 
but is a sort of hybrid. Balanced scorecard is one of the latest innovations in 
management, launched by Kaplan and Norton (1996) as a tool of strategic control, and 
it has become a popular tool in both private and public organizations. 
We also include customer surveys as a separate variable. This tool does not fit into any 
of the four clusters, but cuts across all of them. Customer surveys are supposed to 
improve quality, increase performance steering and support both general management 
tools and also balanced scorecard. 69% of the agencies report that they use this tool.14  
These five different families of management tools are more complementary than 
alternative or competing standards. There are no significant negative correlations 
between them. The quality tools index has a significant positive correlation with 
customer surveys (.27) and with the performance-steering tools index (.40). The 
managerial tools index has a significant positive correlation with balanced scorecard 
(.20) and customer surveys (.23), and there is also a significant positive correlation 
between the performance-steering tools index and customer surveys (.26). The main 
picture is that if agencies use one type of standard or tools they also tend to use others.  
In this section we have accounted for variation in the scope and intensity with which 
different tools are used and also revealed different families of tools with overlapping 
relations. In the next section we will examine the variation between agencies in the total 
number of tools used as well as in the use of different types of tools.  
Bivariate and multivariate analyses 
This section focuses on how the scores on the different independent variables, i.e. our 
indicators of structural, cultural and environmental features, correlate with the adoption 
of modern management tools. We first examine the bivariate relations between each set 
of independent and dependent variables, and then do a multivariate analysis of the 
relative importance of the various independent variables for the total number of tools, 
                                                 
13 The index is constructed by counting occurrences of agencies reporting that they use the three tools included in 
category 3. The intercorrelations between these tools range from .17 to .34. 
14 Value-based management does not fit into any of the categories either. Since only a few agencies report that they 
use this tool, we exclude it from the rest of the analysis. 
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managerial tools, quality tools, performance-steering tools, customer surveys and 
balanced scorecard.  
Environmental features. Market competition tends to affect the number of tools used to 
some extent, but in the opposite direction to that expected from our general hypothesis 
(H4), based on regarding management tools as external regulation of organizations? 
However, our specific hypothesis (H3) that tools like customer surveys would be more 
widespread among agencies operating with some kind of competition than in other 
agencies gets some support. With regard to the importance of external criticism agencies 
exposed to criticism tend to use some types of tools (quality tools and performance-
steering tools) to a larger extent than agencies not exposed to criticism, in accordance 
with our general hypothesis (H2) on the size of the shopping basket. 
Table 3 Bivariate correlations between independent and dependent variables. Pearson’s R. (N=137) 
 Managerial 
tools 
Quality 
tools 
Performance 
steering tools 
Balanced 
Scorecard 
Customer 
Surveys 
Number of 
tools 
Environmental 
features: 
Market 
competition 
Criticism 
 
 
.12 
.09 
 
 
.18* 
-.17* 
 
 
.06 
-.21* 
 
 
-.09 
-.03 
 
 
.22* 
.07 
 
 
.16 
-.07 
Cultural 
features: 
Agency age 
Agency size 
Quality of 
service culture 
 
 
.02 
.01 
-.11 
 
 
.04 
.46** 
-.11 
 
 
.04 
.29** 
-.18* 
 
 
.02 
.10 
.02 
 
 
.01 
.39** 
-.08 
 
 
.06 
.36** 
-.18* 
Structural 
features: 
Form of 
affiliation 
Primary tasks 
 
 
.15 
.18* 
 
 
.13 
.06 
 
 
.32** 
.05 
 
 
-.04 
-.07 
 
 
.32** 
.13 
 
 
.26** 
.14 
** Significant at the .01 level; * Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
Market competition: 0) no, 1) yes; Criticism: 0) to some or very large extent, 1) to a small or no extent; 
Form of affiliation: 0) ordinary agencies, 1) other agencies; Primary tasks: 0) other tasks, 1) service 
provision or production tasks; Agency age: 0) established before 1990, 1) established 1990 or later; 
Agency size: 1) small (≤50 employees), 2) medium-sized (50–199 employees), 3) large (≥200 employees); 
Quality of services culture: 0) average or less, 1) very good or good. 
Structural features  
Table 3 reveals that form of affiliation makes a difference with regard to the use of 
management tools. Agencies with some form and degree of formal autonomy report 
that they use a larger number of tools than ordinary agencies. This does not lend much 
support to our general hypothesis (H5a) based on regarding management tools as 
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external regulation of organizations, but are more in line with the alternative general 
hypothesis (H5b) that that the structurally devolved agencies will adopt management 
tools to a greater extent than agencies that are structurally closer to the ministry. In 
particular, the structurally devolved agencies use performance-steering tools and 
customer surveys to a greater extent than other agencies.  
Table 3 also reveals that the type of primary tasks only makes a difference for the use 
of the family of managerial techniques. Thus, neither our general hypothesis (H6) that 
agencies with service-providing or producing tasks will use fewer management tools 
than other agencies, nor our more specific hypothesis (H7) that they will use more 
quality tools and customer surveys than other agencies is confirmed.  
Cultural features  
The most important cultural feature seems to be agency size. There is a strong positive 
correlation between size and the use of management tools in general, and in particular 
for quality tools, performance-steering tools and customer surveys. Large agencies use 
such tools to a greater extent than small agencies. This accord with our general 
hypothesis (H9), which predicted that large agencies, being less homogenous and having 
more capacity, would use management tools to a greater extent than small agencies.  
There is also an effect of quality of service culture. Agencies that assess the quality of 
their own services as very good or good tend to use fewer management tools, especially 
fewer performance-steering tools, than other agencies. We thus find some support for 
our general hypothesis (H10) based on regarding management tools as external 
regulation of organizations? However, the more specific hypothesis (H11) that tools like 
customer surveys will be more widespread among agencies with a strong quality of 
service culture than in other agencies does not get any support. There is no effect of 
agency age on the use of modern management tools. Thus, our general hypothesis on the 
importance of age (H8) does not get any support.  
One interesting finding from the bivariate analyses is that the only dependent 
variable having no significant correlations is the balanced scorecard. One interpretation 
of this finding is that this tool might be emerging as a new super-standard. This also 
accords with our hypothesis (H1) on low variation between state agencies. However, for 
the other types of tools there are several significant correlations, in contrast to the 
general isomorphism hypothesis. The number of tools used may also be regarded as 
quite high, in accordance with this hypothesis.  
Multivariate analysis  
We now turn to the question of the relative explanatory power of the different 
independent variables for the different management tools. The multivariate analyses, 
summed up in Table 4, generally confirm the main pattern revealed in the bivariate 
analyses.15  
First, the independent variables explain a substantial part of the variation in the use 
of management tools in general, and especially in the use of quality tools, performance 
steering tools and customer surveys. Second, the most important explanatory variable is 
                                                 
15 Only variables with significant bivariate correlations are included in the analysis.  
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agency size. This is especially the case for the use of quality tools and customer surveys, 
but also for the total number of tools used. 
Table 4. Summary of regression equations by structural, cultural and environmental features affecting 
the use of management tools. Standardized Beta coefficients. Linear regressions. (N =137) 
 Managerial 
tools 
Quality tools Performance 
steering tools 
Customer Surveys Number of tools 
Environmental 
features: 
Market 
competition 
Criticism 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
.11 
-.12 
 
 
- 
-.19* 
 
 
.02 
- 
 
 
- 
- 
Cultural 
features: 
Agency size 
Quality of 
service culture 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
.42** 
- 
 
 
.17* 
-.07 
 
 
.32** 
- 
 
 
.30** 
-.10 
Structural 
features: 
Form of 
affiliation 
Primary tasks 
 
 
- 
.18* 
 
 
- 
- 
 
 
.25** 
- 
 
 
.20** 
- 
 
 
.14 
- 
Multiple R 
R2 
Adjusted R2 
F Statistics 
Significance of 
F 
.18a 
.03 
.02 
4.350 
 
.039a 
.48a 
.23 
.21 
13.337 
 
.000a 
.43a 
.18 
.16 
7.400 
 
.000a 
.44a 
.19 
.17 
10.447 
 
.000a 
.41a 
.16 
.15 
8.736 
 
.000a 
**: Significant at the .01 level; *: Significant at the .05 level (2-tailed). 
Third, form of affiliation also makes a difference for the use of performance-steering 
tools and customer surveys, and primary tasks have a significant effect on the use of 
what we have called KTS management tools. Fourth, the importance of environmental 
factors is reduced when controlling for other variables, indicating that the support we 
found in the bivariate analysis does not hold when other factors are considered. There 
is, though, still a significant effect of public criticism on the use of performance- 
steering tools. 
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Discussion and conclusion 
In this paper we have first shown that the use of modern management tools is 
widespread within government agencies in Norway. On average, the agencies report that 
they use six different tools. Some of them are very popular and have become super-
standards adopted almost everywhere. They have become part of the script about how 
to organize modern public agencies. Regarding the tools as expressions of regulation 
inside government, we find that, in spite of a trend towards autonomization, 
agencification, deregulation and increased flexibility in administrative and regulatory 
reforms, there are a large number of different tools used in the various agencies. A 
super-standard may be coercive, such as MBOR, which has been made mandatory by 
higher authorities, but it may also be more voluntary, such as customer surveys. Thus, 
we face a combination of formal «hard laws» and regulations imposed and enforced in a 
top-down process, and informal «soft» rules introduced as standards and guidelines 
more from the bottom up (Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006). Deregulation and 
reregulation thus operate in tandem (Christensen and Lægreid 2006). Not all tools have 
moved into public-sector organizations to the same degree, however. There is obviously 
a selection process going on. To explore the importance of ideas on selection and 
isomorphism more fully we would need longitudinal data, and not cross-sectional data 
like that provided by this survey. 
Second, we have revealed different families of management tools, such as quality 
tools, performance-steering tools and managerial tools. The NPM movement does not 
represent a decisive move away from rule-based and process-driven approaches to 
administration. There might now be more rule- and process-driven styles of government 
than ever before (Hood et al. 1999, 2004).  
Third, the different tools and families of tools are more complementary than 
alternative standards. New tools and techniques supplement or complement old ones, 
rather than replacing them. New process rules are added without a substantial reduction 
in the old ones. We do not see a general trend towards deregulated and entrepreneurial 
government, as suggested in the contemporary reform movement, but an emergence of 
reshaped and partly new oversight systems often emerging in hybrid forms. 
Fourth, there is also significant variation in the use of different types of tools, but 
less so for balanced scorecard and managerial tools than for other tools. Balanced 
scorecard and the family managerial tools appear to be adopted to the same extent in all 
kinds of agencies. Thus, they seem to be decontextualized tools to a great extent.  
Use of the other tools depends to a larger extent on contextual features. The most 
important factor here is agency size. Generally, large agencies adopt more of the 
modern management tools and reinvention reforms than small agencies (cf. Brudney et 
al. 1999, Moynihan and Ingraham 2004). Especially performance steering tools, quality 
tools and customer surveys, are more common in large organizations than in small. This 
is probably due to the fact that large organizations generally have more resources, 
competence and capability, but also that they are more culturally heterogeneous. 
Modern management tools provide control mechanisms that are more needed in large 
organizations than in small. The combination of more capacity and greater demand 
enhances the use of modern management tools in agencies. 
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Fifth, there is also some effect of structural features, such as form of affiliation and 
primary tasks, and also of external criticism. When an agency is heavily criticized from 
outside there is a greater tendency to use performance steering tools, a finding that is 
also revealed in case studies in the Norwegian central government (Ramslien 2005). This 
is what might be expected from a neo-institutional perspective as a strategy to enhance 
legitimacy.   
Sixth, the management tools can bee seen both as regulation inside government and 
as a shopping basket. Some tools such as MBOR and performance reporting are 
cohesive regulatory tools imposed from external public bodies and are generally adopted 
in state organizations. Others are more popular techniques picked for the shopping 
basket of management tools and adopted in a majority of state organizations, such as 
customer service, knowledge based management and team-based management. A third 
category is tools that often remain on the shelves and are only adopted by very few state 
organizations, such as activity based management, activity based costing, value process 
management and economic value added.  
We find that hypotheses based on regarding the tools as part of a shopping basket 
are supported to a somewhat larger extent than hypotheses based on regarding them as 
an expression of regulation inside government. More specific hypotheses for the use of 
certain tools, based on the importance of technical and institutional environments, only 
get a limited support. The main impression, then, is that there is no one-factor 
explanation for the variation in the use of management tools by Norwegian state 
organizations. Cultural features, such as size, make a significant difference, but structural 
and environmental features also have some explanatory power. In addition, size can also 
be seen as a proxy for cultural features such as cultural homogeneity but also for 
structural features such as capacity and capability. 
What, then, are the practical and theoretical implications of these findings? Regarding 
the management tools as potential regulatory tools, we find that after a decade of 
administrative and regulatory reforms aimed at increasing the autonomy of agencies in 
general, the agencies still report that they use a lot of regulatory tools. Thus, there is 
much regulation inside government in which government officials oversee the work of 
other bureaucrats using rules formulated within the government on how public bodies 
should operate (Lægreid, Roness and Rubecksen 2005, 2006b). While agencies may have 
more autonomy from the ministries, they also face an expansion in oversight both from 
traditional ex ante authorization and from newer ex post audit and assessment measures 
(Hood et al. 1999, Christensen and Lægreid 1998). In addition, they also apply a variety 
of management tools and quality assessment techniques. We have also revealed that 
oversight is supplemented by tools in which mutuality and cultural factors are main 
components. The old forms of regulation and control do not fade away in the new 
regulatory state; rather, they are supplemented by new instruments of control, resulting 
in a more complex regulatory regime.  
In this paper we have partly focused on regulation as an internal means of control of 
formal organizations. The increase in the autonomy of formal organizations in the 
public sector has produced a greater need for more formal control (Brunsson and 
Sahlin-Andersson 2000). Deregulation has produced a large number of autonomous 
formal organizations, and this in turn increases the need for regulation. Thus, 
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agencification and regulation go in tandem (Christensen and Lægreid 2006). 
Autonomous organizations need regulation and regulation needs autonomous 
organizations. But it is not only a question of demand. The tools and techniques also 
spread irrespective of their problem-solving capability. There is a tendency to follow 
fads, fashions and dominant ideas, so that copying and diffusion are main mechanisms 
(Christensen and Lægreid 2006, Levi-Faur 2002). The choice for managerial and political 
executives seems to be more about when and under what conditions modern 
management tools should be included in the shopping basket rather than whether they 
should be there at all.  
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23‐2004  Jacob Aars og Svein Kvalvåg: «Politiske uttrykksformer i en bykontekst». Desember 2004. 
24‐2004  Ingrid Helgøy: «Active Ageing in the Labour Market. Country Report − Norway». December 
2004. 
25‐2004  Torgeir Sveri: «Strukturer og reformer. En kvalitativ analyse av reformen  ’Enhetlig  ledelse’ 
sett i lys av sykehusets arbeidsorganisering». Desember 2004. 
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26‐2004  Stig Helleren: «Arbeidstilsynets rollekonflikt: Vekslende tilsynsstrategier mellom kontroll og 
veiledning». Desember 2004. 
27‐2004  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Odd  Rune  Straume:  «Globalisation  and  Union 
Opposition to Technological Change». December 2004. The Globalization Program. 
28‐2004  Frode  Meland:  «A  Union  Bashing  Model  of  Inflation  Targeting».  December  2004.  The 
Globalization Program. 
2003 
1‐2003  Tom Christensen og Per Lægreid: «Politisk styring og privatisering: holdninger i elitene og 
befolkningen». Mars 2003. 
2‐2003  Ivar Bleiklie, Per Lægreid and Marjoleine H. Wik: «Changing Government Control in Norway: 
High Civil Service, Universities and Prisons». March 2003. 
3‐2003  Badi H. Baltagi, Espen Bratberg and Tor Helge Holmås: «A Panel Data Study of Physiciansʹ 
Labor Supply: The Case of Norway». March 2003. HEB. 
4‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Frode  Meland  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Unionised  Oligopoly,  Trade 
Liberalisation and Location Choice». March 2003. The Globalization Program. 
5‐2003  Lise Hellebø: «Nordic Alcohol Policy and Globalization as a Changing Force». April 2003. 
6‐2003  Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynsroller i samferdselssektoren». April 2003. 
7‐2003  Tom  Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Trust  in  Government  –  the  Significance  of  Attitudes 
Towards Democracy, the Public Sector and Public Sector Reforms». April 2003. 
8‐2003  Rune Ervik: «Global Normative Standards and National Solutions for Pension Provision: The 
World Bank, ILO, Norway and South Africa  in Comparative Perspective». April 2003. The 
Globalization Program. 
9‐2003  Nanna Kildal: «The Welfare State: Three Normative Tensions». Mai 2003. 
10‐2003  Simon Neby: «Politisk styring og institusjonell autonomi – tre illustrasjoner». Mai 2003. 
11‐2003  Nina  Berven:  «Cross  National  Comparison  and  National  Contexts:  Is  what  we  Compare 
Comparable?». July 2003. The Globalization Program. 
12‐2003  Hilde  Hatleskog  Zeiner:  «Kontrollhensyn  og  kontrollpraksis.  En  studie  av  Food  and 
Veterinary Office (FVO)». August 2003. 
13‐2003 Nanna Kildal: «Perspectives on Policy Transfer: The Case of the OECD». August 2003. 
14‐2003 Erik Allardt: «Two Lectures: Stein Rokkan and the Twentieth Century Social Science». «Den 
sociala rapporteringens tidstypiska förankring». September 2003. 
15‐2003  Ilcheong  Yi:  «The  National  Patterns  of  Unemployment  Policies  in  Two  Asian  Countries: 
Malaysia and South Korea». September 2003. The Globalization Program. 
16‐2003 Dag Arne Christensen: «Active Ageing: Country Report Norway». November 2003. 
17‐2003 Kim Ove Hommen: «Tilsynspolitikk i Norge: Utflytting og autonomi». November 2003. 
18‐2003  Dag Arne Christensen, Rune Ervik and Ingrid Helgøy: «The Impact of Institutional Legacies on 
Active Ageing Policies: Norway and UK as Contrasting Cases». December 2003. 
19‐2003  Ole  Frithjof Norheim  og  Benedicte  Carlsen:  «Legens  doble  rolle  som  advokat  og  portvakt  i 
Fastlegeordningen. Evaluering av fastlegeordningen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
20‐2003  Kurt R. Brekke og Odd Rune Straume: «Pris‐ og avanseregulering  i  legemiddelmarkedet. En 
prinsipiell diskusjon og en vurdering av den norske modellen». Desember 2003. HEB. 
21‐2003  Per Lægreid, Vidar W. Rolland, Paul G. Roness and John‐Erik Ågotnes: «The Structural Anatomy 
of the Norwegian State 1947‒2003». December 2003. 
22‐2003  Ivar  Bleiklie, Haldor  Byrkjeflot  and  Katarina Östergren:  «Taking  Power  from Knowledge. A 
Theoretical Framework for the Study of Two Public Sector Reforms». December 2003. ATM.  
23‐2003  Per  Lægreid,  Ståle  Opedal  and  Inger  Marie  Stigen:  «The  Norwegian  Hospital  Reform  – 
Balancing Political Control and Enterprise Autonomy». December 2003. ATM. 
24‐2003  Håkon  Høst:  «Kompetansemåling  eller  voksenutdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene? 
Underveisrapport fra en studie av pleie‐ og omsorgsutdanningene». Desember 2003. 
25‐2003  Kjell  Erik  Lommerud,  Odd  Rune  Straume  and  Lars  Sørgard:  «Downstream  merger  with 
upstream market power». The Globalization Program. December 2003. 
26‐2003  Ingrid Drexel: «Two Lectures: The Concept of Competence – an Instrument of Social and 
Political Change». «Centrally Coordinated Decentralization – No Problem? Lessons from the 
Italian Case». December 2003. 
2002 
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1‐2002  Håkon  Høst:  «Lærlingeordning  eller  skolebasert  utdanning  i  pleie‐  og  omsorgsfagene?». 
April 2002. 
2‐2002  Jan‐Kåre  Breivik,  Hilde  Haualand  and  Per  Solvang:  «Rome  –  a  Temporary  Deaf  City! 
Deaflympics 2001». June 2002. 
3‐2002  Jan‐Kåre Breivik, Hilde Haualand og Per Solvang: «Roma – en midlertidig døv by! Deaflympics 
2001». Juni 2002. 
4‐2002  Christian Madsen: «Spiller det noen rolle? – om hverdagen på nye og gamle sykehjem». Juni 
2002. 
5‐2002  Elin Aasmundrud Mathiesen: «Fritt  sykehusvalg. En  teoretisk  analyse  av konkurranse  i det 
norske sykehusmarkedet». Juni 2002. HEB. 
6‐2002  Tor Helge Holmås: «Keeping Nurses at Work: A Duration Analysis». June 2002. HEB. 
7‐2002  Ingvild Halland Ørnsrud:  «Mål‐  og  resultatstyring  gjennom  statlige  budsjettreformer».  Juli 
2002. 
8‐2002  Torstein Haaland: «Tid, situasjonisme og institusjonell utakt i systemer». Juli 2002. 
9‐2002  Kristin  Strømsnes:  «Samspillet  mellom  frivillig  organisering  og  demokrati:  Teoretiske 
argument og empirisk dokumentasjon». August 2002. 
10‐2002  Marjoleine Hooijkaas Wik:  «Mangfold  eller konformitet? Likheter og  forskjeller  innenfor og 
mellom fem statlige tilknytningsformer». August 2002. 
11‐2002  Knut Helland:«Den opprinnelige symbiosen mellom fotball og presse». September 2002. 
12‐2002  Nina Berven: «National Politics and Global Ideas? Welfare, Work and Legitimacy in Norway 
and the United States». September 2002. The Globalization Program. 
13‐2002  Johannes  Hjellbrekke:  «Globalisering  som  utfordring  til  samfunnsvitskapane».  September 
2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
14‐2002  Atle  Møen:  «Den  globale  produksjonen  av  symbol  og  kunnskap.  Verdsflukt  og 
verdsherredømme». September 2002. Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
15‐2002  Tom Christensen  and  Per  Lægreid:  «Complex  Patterns  of  Interaction  and  Influence Among 
Political and Administrative Leaders». October 2002. 
16‐2002  Ivar Bleiklie: «Hierarchy and Specialization. On Institutional Integration of Higher Education 
Systems». Oktober 2002. 
17‐002  Per Lægreid, Runolfur Smari Steinthorsson and Baldur Thorhallsson: «Europeanization of Public 
Administration:  Effects  of  the  EU  on  the  Central  Administration  in  the  Nordic  States». 
November 2002. 
18‐2002  Tom Christensen and Per Lægreid: «Trust in Government — the Relative Importance of Service 
Satisfaction, Political Factors and Demography». November 2002. 
19‐2002  Marit  Tjomsland:  «Arbeidsinnvandringssituasjonen  i  Norge  etter  1975».  November  2002. 
Globaliseringsprogrammet. 
20‐2002  Augustín José Menéndez m.fl.: «Taxing Europe. The Case for European Taxes in Federal 
Perspective». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
21‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Globalization and Risky Human Capital 
Investment».December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
22‐2002  Fredrik Andersson and Kai A. Konrad: «Human Capital Investment and Globalization in 
Extortionary States». December 2002. The Globalization Program. 
23‐2002  Anne Lise Fimreite, Yngve Flo og Jacob Aars: «Generalistkommune og oppgavedifferensiering. 
Tre innlegg». Desember 2002.  
24‐2002  Knut Grove: «Frå privat initiativ til kommunalt monopol. Lysverk, sporvegar og renovasjon i 
Bergen og Oslo 1850–1935». Desember 2002. 
25‐2002  Knut Grove: «Mellom ʹnon‐interventionʹ og ʹsamfundsvillieʹ. Statleg og kommunal regulering 
av økonomisk verksemd i Norge på 1800‐talet». Desember 2002. 
26‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen: «Hovedtyper av valgordninger. Proporsjonalitet eller politisk 
styring?». Desember 2002. 
27‐2002  Jan Erik Askildsen, Badi H. Baltagi and Tor Helge Holmås: «Will Increased Wages Reduce 
Shortage of Nurses? A Panel Data Analysis f Nursesʹ Labour Supply». December 2002. HEB. 
28‐2002  Sturla Gjesdal, Peder R. Ringdal, Kjell Haug and John Gunnar Mæland: «Medical Predictors of 
Disability Pension in Long‐Term Sickness Absence. December 2002. HEB. 
MODERN MANAGEMENT  TOOLS  IN  NORWEGIAN  STATE  AGENCIES WORKING PAPER  13  -  2006  
 37 
29‐2002  Dag Arne Christensen og Jacob Aars: «Teknologi og demokrati. Med norske kommuner på 
nett!». Desember 2002. 
30‐2002  Jacob Aars: «Byfolk og politikk. Gjennomgang av data fra en befolkningsundersøkelse i 
Bergen, Oslo og Tromsø». Desember 2002. 
31‐2002  Hjørdis Grove: «Kommunaliseringsprosessen i Århus 1850–1940». Desember 2002. 
 
 
